

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

GS HOLISTIC, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

WHAM BONNEY LAKE INC., et
al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C23-5213JLR

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC's ("GS Holistic") motion for entry of default judgment against Defendants Wham Bonney Lake Inc. d/b/a Tobacco Time ("Tobacco Time"), Sukjoo Lee, and Hana Choi (together, "Defendants"). (Mot. (Dkt. # 16); *see* Prop. Judgment (Dkt. # 16-3).) None of the Defendants have appeared in this action, and the Clerk has entered default against all three Defendants. (*See* Dkt.; 6/8/23 Entry of Default (Dkt. # 9); 8/23/23 Entry of Default (Dkt. # 13).) The court has

1 considered GS Holistic’s motion, the materials it submitted in support of its motion, the
2 relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being fully advised, the court
3 GRANTS in part and DENIES in part GS Holistic’s motion for entry of default
4 judgment.

5 **II. BACKGROUND**

6 GS Holistic is a Delaware limited liability corporation (“LLC”) that has its
7 principal place of business in California. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 4.) It alleges that it is the
8 registered owner of the “Stündenglass” trademarks, has worked to distinguish the
9 Stündenglass brand as “the premier manufacturer of glass infusers,” and has devoted
10 significant time and resources to promoting and protecting its trademark. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 8-10,
11 15.) GS Holistic has registered the following trademarks: (1) U.S. Trademark
12 Registration No. 6,633,884 “for the standard character mark ‘Stündenglass’ in association
13 with goods further identified in registration in international class 011”; (2) U.S.
14 Trademark Registration No. 6,174,292 “for the design plus words mark ‘S’ and its logo
15 in association with goods further identified in the registration in international class 034”;
16 and (3) U.S. Trademark Registration No. 6,174,291 “for the standard character mark
17 ‘Stündenglass’ in association with goods further identified in registration in international
18 class 034” (together, the “Stündenglass Marks”).¹ (*Id.* ¶ 11; *see also* Mot., Ex. A
19 (screenshots of pages from the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark
20

21 ¹ GS Holistic refers to these trademarks interchangeably in its complaint as either the
22 “Stündenglass Marks” or the “Stündenglass Trademarks.” The court uses the term
“Stündenglass Marks” in this order.

1 Electronic Search System that describe these trademarks).) GS Holistic asserts that
2 consumers are willing to pay more for “the recognized quality and innovation associated
3 with the Stündenglass Marks.” (Compl. ¶ 21.) Thus, genuine Stündenglass brand glass
4 infusers are priced at \$599.95, while non-Stündenglass infusers sell for between \$199.00
5 and \$600.00. (*Id.*)

6 Defendant Tobacco Time is a Washington LLC that has its principal place of
7 business in Washington. (*Id.* ¶ 5.) Defendants Sukjoo Lee and Hana Choi are residents
8 and citizens of Washington and the owners of Tobacco Time. (*Id.* at 1; *id.* ¶¶ 6-7, 24.)
9 GS Holistic alleges that Defendants sold counterfeit products bearing the Stündenglass
10 Marks. (*Id.* ¶¶ 25-28.) On January 31, 2023, according to GS Holistic, its investigator
11 visited Tobacco Time’s location; observed that the shop had “an excess of” glass infusers
12 that displayed the Stündenglass Marks; purchased a glass infuser “with a Stündenglass
13 Mark affixed to it” for \$470.41; and determined the glass infuser was a counterfeit
14 product that displayed “the Infringing Marks.” (*Id.* ¶ 30; *see also id.* ¶ 26 (defining the
15 “Infringing Marks” as “reproductions, counterfeits, copies, and/or colorable imitations of
16 one or more of the Stündenglass Marks”).)

17 GS Holistic filed its complaint on March 14, 2023. (*See id.* at 1.) It alleges claims
18 under the Lanham Act against both Defendants for counterfeiting and trademark
19 infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and for false designation of origin and
20 unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). (*Id.* ¶¶ 52-69.) Among other
21 relief, it seeks damages, costs of suit, a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants
22 from continuing to infringe its Stündenglass trademarks, and an order requiring

1 Defendants to deliver all infringing products to GS Holistic for destruction. (*Id.* at
2 12-14.)

3 GS Holistic served Ms. Choi on April 8, 2023, and served Tobacco Time and Mr.
4 Lee on June 9, 2023. (*See* Service Affs. (Dkt. ## 7, 10-11).) The Clerk entered default
5 against Ms. Choi on June 8, 2023, and against Tobacco Time and Mr. Lee on August 23,
6 2023. (6/8/23 Entry of Default; 8/23/23 Entry of Default.) GS Holistic filed this motion
7 for entry of default judgment on November 17, 2023. (Mot.)

8 III. ANALYSIS

9 Below, the court sets forth the relevant legal standard and then evaluates GS
10 Holistic's motion for entry of default judgment.

11 A. Legal Standard

12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes the court to enter default
13 judgment against a defaulting defendant upon the plaintiff's motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
14 55(a), (b)(2). After default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint,
15 except those related to damages, are considered admitted and are sufficient to establish a
16 defendant's liability. *TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir.
17 1987) (citing *Geddes v. United Fin. Grp.*, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).

18 Entry of default judgment is left to the court's sound discretion. *Aldabe v. Aldabe*,
19 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In exercising its discretion, the court considers
20 seven factors (the "*Eitel* factors"): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief
21 is denied; (2) the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claims; (3) the sufficiency of the
22 claims raised in the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in relationship to the

1 defendant's behavior; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts;
2 (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on
3 the merits when reasonably possible. *Eitel v. McCool*, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.
4 1986). After the court determines that default judgment is appropriate, it must then
5 determine the amount and character of the relief that should be awarded. *See TeleVideo*,
6 826 F.2d at 917-18.

7 **B. Whether the *Eitel* Factors Favor Default Judgment**

8 The court preliminarily determines that default judgment is warranted in this case
9 because, on balance, the *Eitel* factors weigh in favor of such judgment. The court
10 discusses each factor in turn.

11 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

12 The first *Eitel* factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if default
13 judgment is not entered. *See PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans*, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172,
14 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Without default judgment, GS Holistic will suffer prejudice
15 because it will “be denied the right to judicial resolution” of its claims and will be
16 “without other recourse for recovery.” *Elektra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Crawford*, 226 F.R.D.
17 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, the first *Eitel* factor weighs in favor of entering default
18 judgment.

19 2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint

20 The second and third *Eitel* factors—the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claim
21 and the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint—are frequently analyzed together.
22 *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. For these two factors to weigh in favor of default

judgment, the complaint's allegations must be sufficient to state a claim for relief. *Danning v. Lavine*, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). A complaint satisfies this standard when it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). At the default judgment stage, the court "must take the well-pleaded factual allegations [in the complaint] as true" but "necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default." *Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).

GS Holistic alleges claims for trademark counterfeiting and infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). (Compl. ¶¶ 52-69.) The court reviews each in turn.

a. Trademark Counterfeiting and Infringement

To prove liability for trademark infringement, the trademark holder must demonstrate: (1) "ownership of a valid mark (i.e., a protectable interest)"; and (2) the alleged infringer's use of the mark "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" consumers. *Reno Air Racing Ass'n., v. McCord*, 452 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.*, 408 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2005)).

First, uncontested proof that the plaintiff has registered the mark is sufficient to establish ownership of a valid mark. *Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard*, 775 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, because GS Holistic alleges that it registered the

1 Stündenglass Marks (Compl. ¶ 11), it satisfies the first element of trademark
2 infringement for the purpose of default judgment.

3 Second, “[l]ikelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark
4 would probably assume that the goods it represents are associated with the source of a
5 different product identified by a similar mark.” *KP Permanent Make-Up*, 408 F.3d at
6 608. Courts generally evaluate eight factors to determine whether confusion is likely:
7 “1) the strength of the mark; 2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; 3) the similarity of
8 the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) the marketing channels used; 6) the degree
9 of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods; 7) the defendant’s intent
10 in selecting the mark; and 8) the likelihood of expansion into other markets.” *Id.* Where
11 a defendant uses a counterfeit mark, however, courts both within and outside the Ninth
12 Circuit presume a likelihood of consumer confusion. *See Coach, Inc. v. Pegasus Theater*
13 *Shops*, No. C12-1631MJP, 2013 WL 5406220, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2013)
14 (compiling cases); *see also Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse*
15 *Corp.*, 689 F. Supp. 2d 585, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To find a likelihood of confusion, a
16 court need only determine that the items at issue are counterfeit and that the defendant
17 distributed, offered for sale, or sold the items.”). The Lanham Act defines a “counterfeit”
18 as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a
19 registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

20 Here, GS Holistic alleges that its investigator purchased a glass infuser with a
21 Stündenglass Mark “affixed” to it and determined that it was a counterfeit product that
22 displayed the “the Infringing Marks.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) GS Holistic further alleges that the

1 “Infringing Marks” are “reproductions, counterfeits, copies and/or colorable imitations of
2 one or more of the Stündenglass Marks.” (*Id.* ¶ 26.) Accordingly, the court concludes
3 that GS Holistic has sufficiently alleged that Defendants sold a product bearing a
4 counterfeit mark and, as a result, there is a presumption of consumer confusion. *See*
5 *Coach, Inc.*, 2013 WL 5406220, at *3. Thus, because GS Holistic has demonstrated that
6 it owns a valid mark and that Defendants’ use of the mark is likely to cause consumer
7 confusion, the court concludes that GS Holistic has sufficiently alleged its trademark
8 counterfeiting and infringement claim.

9 *b. False Designation of Origin*

10 To show liability for false designation of origin, the plaintiff must show that the
11 defendant “(1) use[d] in commerce (2) any word, false designation of origin, false or
12 misleading description, or representation of fact, which (3) is likely to cause confusion or
13 misrepresents the characteristics of his or another person’s goods or services.” *Freecycle*
14 *Network, Inc. v. Oey*, 505 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007). As to the first two elements, GS
15 Holistic alleges that Defendants sold (and thus, used in commerce) at least one glass
16 infuser bearing at least one of its registered trademarks. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-30.) And the
17 court concluded above that GS Holistic has plausibly alleged a likelihood of confusion
18 resulting from Defendants’ use of the trademarks. Accordingly, GS Holistic has stated a
19 false designation of origin claim.

20 Because GS Holistic has demonstrated that its claims have substantive merit and
21 that it has sufficiently alleged those claims in its complaint, the court concludes that the
22 second and third *Eitel* factors weigh in favor of default judgment.

1 3. Sum of Money at Stake

2 Under the fourth *Eitel* factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at
3 stake in relation to the seriousness of the [d]efendant’s conduct.” *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp.
4 2d at 1176. Here, GS Holistic seeks (1) \$150,000 in statutory damages—\$50,000 per
5 registered Stündenglass trademark—for willful trademark counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C.
6 § 1117(d) and (2) costs in the amount of \$1,222.41. (*See* Mot. at 2.) The court concludes
7 that the requested statutory damages and costs are not so unreasonable in relation to the
8 conduct alleged in the complaint as to weigh against entry of default judgment.

9 4. Possibility of a Dispute over Material Facts

10 “The fifth *Eitel* factor considers the possibility of dispute as to any material facts
11 in the case.” *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Where, as here, the defendant has
12 defaulted, the court must take all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, except
13 those related to damages. *TeleVideo*, 826 F.2d at 917-18; *see also Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG*
14 *Holdings, Inc.*, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Where a plaintiff has filed
15 a well-pleaded complaint, the possibility of dispute concerning material facts is
16 remote.”). Thus, the court concludes there is little risk of dispute over material facts and
17 the fifth *Eitel* factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.

18 5. Excusable Neglect

19 The sixth *Eitel* factor considers the possibility that the defendant’s default resulted
20 from excusable neglect. *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, GS Holistic has
21 provided evidence that Defendants were properly served (*see* Service Affs.), and there is
22 no evidence in the record that Defendants’ failure to answer or respond is the result of

1 excusable neglect. Accordingly, the court concludes that the sixth *Eitel* factor weighs in
2 favor of default judgment.

3 6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits

4 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” *Eitel*,
5 782 F.2d at 1472. Where, as here, a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in action,
6 however, the policy favoring decisions on the merits is not dispositive. *PepsiCo*, 238 F.
7 Supp. 2d at 1177. Therefore, the court concludes that the seventh *Eitel* factor does not
8 preclude entry of default judgment.

9 In sum, because the *Eitel* factors weigh in favor of default judgment, the court
10 concludes that entry of default judgment is warranted in favor of GS Holistic on its
11 claims against Defendants.

12 **C. Requested Relief**

13 The court now turns to the issue of remedies. “A default judgment must not differ
14 in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the [complaint].” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15 54(c); *see Fong v. United States*, 300 F.2d 400, 413 (9th Cir. 1962). Defaulting
16 defendants are not deemed to have admitted the facts alleged in the complaint concerning
17 the amount of damages. *TeleVideo*, 826 F.2d at 917. Rather, the plaintiff “must ‘prove
18 up’ the amount of damages that it is claiming.” *Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld*
19 *Prod., Inc.*, 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D. Cal. 2003); *see also* Local Rules W.D. Wash.

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LCR 55(b)(2).² By analogy, plaintiffs must also “prove up” their entitlement to other forms of relief, such as a permanent injunction. *See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Tyrrell–Miller*, 678 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

GS Holistic requests statutory damages, litigation costs, injunctive relief, and destruction of the infringing products. (*See* Mot. at 11-14.) The court considers each remedy below.

1. Statutory Damages

Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff may elect whether to recover its actual damages caused by the defendants’ use of a counterfeit mark or statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). GS Holistic has elected to seek statutory damages. (Mot. at 11-13; *see* Compl. at 12-13 (including statutory damages in its prayer for relief).)

The court has discretion to award statutory damages between \$1,000 and \$200,000 “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). If, however, the court finds that the trademark violation was willful, it may award up to \$2,000,000 for each infringement. *Id.* § 1117(c)(2). “[S]tatutory damages may compensate the victim, penalize the

² This court’s Local Civil Rules require plaintiffs to support a motion for default judgment with:

a declaration and other evidence establishing [the] plaintiff’s entitlement to a sum certain and to any nonmonetary relief sought. [The] [p]laintiff shall provide a concise explanation of how all amounts were calculated, and shall support this explanation with evidence establishing the entitlement to and amount of the principal claim, and, if applicable, any liquidated damages, interest, attorney’s fees, or other amounts sought[.]

Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 55(b)(2).

wrongdoer, deter future wrongdoing, or serve all those purposes.” *Y.Y.G.M. SA v. Redbubble, Inc.*, 75 F.4th 995, 1008 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing *Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l*, 40 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1994)). When determining the appropriate amount of statutory damages to award on default judgment, courts consider whether the amount bears a “plausible relationship to [the p]laintiff’s actual damages.” *Yelp Inc. v. Catron*, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting *Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Tilley*, No. C 09-1085 PJH, 2010 WL 309249, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010)). That is, although a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit is entitled to damages that will compensate and serve as a deterrent, “it is not entitled to a windfall.” *Id.*

GS Holistic requests statutory damages of \$50,000 for each of its registered trademarks, for a total of \$150,000. (Mot. at 11-13.) GS Holistic’s evidence of its actual damages caused by Defendants’ trademark violations, however, is limited to allegations that its investigator observed that Tobacco Time had “an excess of” glass infusers that displayed the Stündenglass Marks and purchased a single glass infuser with an unspecified Stündenglass Mark “affixed to it” for \$470.41. (*See* Compl. ¶ 30.) GS Holistic contends that its chief executive officer’s (“CEO”) declaration establishes that \$150,000 is “only a fraction of the actual losses to its business” caused by counterfeiters. (Mot. at 12.) That declaration, however, provides no explanation of how GS Holistic’s CEO determined that the company’s total U.S. sales would have quadrupled in 2021 if there were no counterfeit products in the market and it says absolutely nothing about the damages specifically caused by the Defendants in this case. (*See generally* Folkerts Decl. (Dkt. # 17).) The court is sympathetic to the difficulties GS Holistic faces in estimating

1 actual damages with any degree of certainty without the benefit of Defendants’
2 cooperation in discovery. (*See* Mot. at 12.) Without more evidence, however, the court
3 cannot conclude that an award of \$50,000 in statutory damages for each of GS Holistic’s
4 three registered trademarks bears a “plausible relationship” to GS Holistic’s actual
5 damages. *Yelp Inc.*, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1102.

6 Because GS Holistic alleges only that the glass infuser its investigator purchased
7 had “a Stündenglass Mark affixed to it” (Compl. ¶ 30), the court concludes that GS
8 Holistic is entitled to statutory damages based on Defendants’ conduct with respect to
9 only one trademark. The court further concludes, in its discretion, that an award of
10 \$5,000 for one trademark violation will serve the compensatory, penal, and deterrent
11 purposes of statutory damages without resulting in an undue windfall for GS Holistic.
12 This amount equates to over ten times the price of the allegedly infringing glass infuser
13 purchased by GS Holistic’s investigator. (*See id.*) Accordingly, the court awards GS
14 Holistic statutory damages of \$5,000.

15 2. Litigation Costs

16 Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff who establishes that a defendant has violated a
17 trademark “shall be entitled, . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover . . . the
18 costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Here, GS Holistic seeks costs in the total
19 amount of \$1,222.41, consisting of the filing fee (\$402.00), its process server fees
20 (\$285.00), and its investigator’s fees (\$535.41). (Mot. at 13 (citing Harris Decl. (Dkt.
21 # 19) ¶ 7); *see* Compl. at 12-13 (including costs of suit in its prayer for relief).) The court
22 awards GS Holistic its filing fee and process server fees because these are costs that are

1 routinely awarded in Lanham Act cases. GS Holistic has not, however, cited any
 2 authority for the proposition that its investigator's fees are recognized "costs of the
 3 action" under the Lanham Act. (*See generally* Mot.) Therefore, the court awards GS
 4 Holistic costs in the amount of \$687.00.

5 3. Injunctive Relief

6 The Lanham Act empowers courts "to grant injunctions, according to the
 7 principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent
 8 the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).

9 According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
 10 permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
 11 such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
 12 irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
 13 damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
 14 the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
 15 equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
 16 by a permanent injunction.

17 *eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.*, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (interpreting similar
 18 language in considering a motion for permanent injunctive relief under the Patent Act).

19 The Lanham Act provides, in the case of a motion for a permanent injunction, that a
 20 "plaintiff seeking any such injunction shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
 21 irreparable harm upon a finding of a [trademark] violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).

22 GS Holistic asks the court to enter the following permanent injunction enjoining
 Tobacco Time, Mr. Lee, and their "agents, employees, officers, directors, owners,
 representatives, successor companies, related companies, and all persons acting in
 concert or participation with" them from:

(a) Import, export, making, manufacture, reproduction, assembly, use, acquisition, purchase, offer, sale, transfer, brokerage, consignment, distribution, storage, shipment, licensing, development, display, delivery, marketing advertising or promotion of the counterfeit Stündenglass product identified in the complaint and any other unauthorized Stündenglass product, counterfeit, copy or colorful imitation thereof; [and]

(b) Assisting, aiding or attempting to assist or aid any other person or entity in performing any of the prohibited activities referred to in Paragraph[] (a) above.

(Mot. at 13-14; *see also* Prop. Judgment at 2.)

The court declines to enter the requested permanent injunction. First, GS Holistic argues only that it is entitled to injunctive relief “[b]y the reasons explained in [its] Complaint.” (Mot. at 13.) It does not address the factors a court must consider before entering a permanent injunction. (*See id.*); *see eBay Inc.*, 547 U.S. at 391. Second, the injunction GS Holistic seeks now is broader than the injunction outlined in its complaint, which does not include an injunction against “[a]ssisting, aiding or attempting to assist or aid” others against performing the actions listed in part (a) of the proposed injunction. (*Compare* Compl. at 13, *with* Prop. Judgment at 2.) Third, although GS Holistic’s complaint describes the sale of one counterfeit Stündenglass glass infuser displaying one unspecified Stündenglass Mark, it requests a wider injunction relating to “the counterfeit Stündenglass product identified in the complaint and any other unauthorized Stündenglass product.” (*Compare* Compl. ¶ 30, *with* Prop. Judgment at 2.) Finally, “every order granting an injunction” must “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). GS Holistic’s proposed judgment violates this rule by referring to

1 “the counterfeit Stündenglass product identified in the complaint.” (*See* Prop. Judgment
2 at 2.) For these reasons, the court denies GS Holistic’s request for a permanent
3 injunction.

4 4. Destruction of Infringing Products


5 Finally, GS Holistic seeks an order directing Defendants, “at their cost, [to] deliver
6 to [GS Holistic] for destruction all products, accessories, labels, signs, prints, packages,
7 wrappers, receptables, advertisements, and other material in their possession, custody or
8 control bearing any of the Stündenglass Marks.” (Mot. at 14; *see also* Prop. Judgment at
9 2.) The Lanham Act authorizes the court to issue an order directing the destruction of
10 articles that infringe upon a trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1118. Here, however, GS Holistic
11 has not presented any argument or evidence supporting its entitlement to this relief,
12 and—as with its request for a permanent injunction—its request for destruction of any
13 article “bearing any of the Stündenglass Marks” is not supported by its investigator’s
14 purchase of a single glass infuser bearing an unspecified Stündenglass Mark. (*See* Mot.
15 at 14; Compl. ¶ 30.) As a result, the court denies GS Holistic’s request for an order
16 directing the destruction of allegedly infringing products.

17 **IV. CONCLUSION**

18 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part GS
19 Holistic’s motion for default judgment (Dkt. # 16). Specifically, the court GRANTS GS
20 Holistic’s request for entry of default judgment against Tobacco Time, Mr. Lee, and Ms.
21 Choi; AWARDS GS Holistic statutory damages in the amount of \$5,000 and litigation
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1 costs in the amount of \$687.00; and DENIES GS Holistic's requests for entry of a
2 permanent injunction and for an order directing the destruction of infringing products.

3 Dated this 21st day of November, 2023.

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6 JAMES L. ROBART
7 United States District Judge
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